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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN D.HALE 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
KURT BECKSTEAD and JOHN 
DOES I through V, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 20020196-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1998). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Did the District Court err in determining Beckstead, a general 
contractor, owed no duty of care to Hale, a subcontractor, when Hale had entered 
Beckstead's property as a business invitee and was injured as the result of a dangerous 
condition created and maintained by Beckstead? 
Standard: Summary judgment is properly granted only when the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This presents a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness and with no deference to the lower court's legal conclusions. Doit, Inc. v. 
Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 841 (Utah 1996). The existence of a legal duty is a 
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question of law reviewed for correctness when the facts giving rise to such duty are not in 
dispute. See Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777 (Utah 1992) (determination of landowner's 
duty of care is question of law). 
Issue No. 2: Did the District Court err in determining Hale could not rely upon 
Beckstead's violation of OSHA standards to show the duty Beckstead owed Hale and 
whether Beckstead breached that duty? 
Standard: Summary judgment is properly granted only when the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This presents a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness and with no deference to the lower court's legal conclusions. Doit, Inc. v. 
louche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 841 (Utah 1996). The existence of a legal duty is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness when the facts giving rise to such duty are not in 
dispute. See Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777 (Utah 1992) (determination of landowner's 
duty of care is question of law). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
There is no constitutional or statutory text whose interpretation is determinative in 
deciding the issues presented by this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Proceeding. This appeal is from an order granting summary judgment in 
favor of Beckstead and against Hale entered in the Fifth Judicial District Court, 
Washington County, the Honorable G. Rand Beacham presiding. 
Course of Proceedings in Lower Court. Hale sued Beckstead for special and general 
damages arising from personal injury suffered in a fall while painting Beckstead's 
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residence, for which Beckstead was also the general contractor. Beckstead moved for 
summary judgment contending that because Hale was an independent contractor whose 
performance was not supervised by Beckstead, Beckstead owed Hale "no duty of care 
concerning the safety of the manner or method of performance implemented." R 63. 
Beckstead then expanded his argument to assert that "an employer or owner that does not 
control the work of the independent contractor has no duty to provide a safe workplace to 
the employees of the independent contractor." R 63. 
Disposition in the Lower Court. The district court granted Beckstead's motion and 
dismissed Plaintiff s complaint. 
RELEVANT FACTS1 
1. Plaintiff complains in this action of injuries he received in a fall. R 100, f 1. 
(See also, Addendum). 
2. Defendant was the owner of the property at which Plaintiff fell R 100,12. 
(See also, Addendum). 
3. A home was under construction on Defendant's property, and Plaintiff was 
inside the partially completed home at the time of Plaintiff s fall. R 101, f^ 3. (See also, 
Addendum). 
4. Defendant was acting as his own "general contractor" for the construction of 
the home. R 101, f^ 4. (See also, Addendum). 
5. Defendant hired Plaintiff to paint the home. R 101, f 5. (See also, Addendum). 
!The first ten numbered paragraphs are verbatim reproductions of the uncontested 
material facts which the district court identified in support of its ruling. See R 100-101. 
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6. Defendant told Plaintiff generally how the paint should look and bought the 
paint for Plaintiff to use. R 101, H 6. (See also, Addendum). 
7. Defendant did not control or direct the manner in which Plaintiff was to paint 
the home. R 101, | 7. (See also, Addendum). 
8. While inside the partially constructed home, Plaintiff inadvertently stepped off 
a second floor balcony and fell to the first level. R 101, ^ 8. (See also, Addendum). 
9. There is no evidence that Plaintiff had authority to enter Defendant's premises 
for any purpose other than to complete his contract to paint the home. R 101, ^ 9. (See 
also, Addendum). 
10. Defendant was not in the home when Plaintiff fell, but was out of town on an 
extended vacation. R 101, f 10. (See also, Addendum). 
11. The edge of the balcony in question was unprotected and in excess of 6 feet 
(1.8 m) above the lower level. R 3, ffij 11-12. 
12. The District Court judge granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
indicating, "[t]his Court is persuaded that Plaintiff fell while on Defendant's premises as a 
business visitor or invitee, that Defendant did not control or direct the manner of 
Plaintiffs work, and that any danger posed to Plaintiff by the condition of Defendant's 
partially completed home was open and obvious to Plaintiff Consequently, under current 
law, Defendant had no duty of care toward Plaintiff concerning the manner or method of 
Plaintiffs work performance and the condition of Defendant' property was not such that 
Defendant would be subject to liability to Plaintiff under the facts of this case. R 101, 
page 3. (See also, Addendum). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court erred in determining Beckstead owed no duty to Hale, a business 
invitee. The District Court also erred in determining that Hale could not use violation of 
OSHA standards to determine Beckstead's duty to Hale, and whether Beckstead breached 
that duty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING "DEFENDANT 
HAD NO DUTY OF CARE TOWARD PLAINTIFF,59 FOR DANGEROUS 
CONDITIONS ON THE PREMISES CREATED AND MAINTAINED 
BY DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD 
In the instant case, the district court interpreted Hale's complaint as attempting to 
advance three independent causes of action: one sounding in negligence, one in premises 
liability, and one based upon Beckstead's failure to comply with certain regulations 
promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). See R 102-
103. In granting Beckstead's motion for summary judgment, the lower court segregated 
what it saw as three distinct claims and denied them seriatim. Applying legal principles 
which isolate a landowner from liability for harm caused by the negligence of an 
independent contractor, the lower court dismissed what it saw as separate and distinct 
claims for negligence and premises liability. See R 102. Then, relying upon 29 U.S.C. § 
653(b)(4) (1985), the district court dismissed what it saw as an independent claim 
premised upon a violation of OSHA regulations. See R 103. 
Hale's complaint, contrary to the District Court's Order, is intended to state a 
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single cause of action. See R. 1-8. In cases involving licensees and business invitees, a 
premises liability claim is, in substance, a negligence claim wherein the degree of the 
duty of care owed is determined by the status the claimant enjoys. See Laws v. Blanding 
City, 893 P.2d 1083 (Utah Ct. App.1995) (comparative negligence is available as a 
defense in a premises liability case). 
The degree of the duty of care Beckstead owed Hale should have been and, indeed, 
was established by the court's determination that Hale's status on the subject premises 
was that of an invitee. R 102. However, in the course of its analysis, the district court 
was erroneously persuaded that Beckstead owed Hale no duty of care whatsoever. In 
moving for summary judgment Beckstead first noted that if he owed Hale no duty, any 
negligence analysis ends and no liability attaches. R 63. Clearly, the viability of 
Plaintiffs claim depends upon the existence of a legal duty owed by Beckstead to Hale 
and a breach of that duty. 
Citing and quoting from Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999), Beckstead 
contended that because Hale was an independent contractor whose work was not directly 
supervised by Beckstead, Beckstead owed Hale "no duty of care concerning the safety of 
the manner or method of performance implemented." R 63. Beckstead then expanded 
his argument to assert that "an employer or owner that does not control the work of the 
independent contractor has no duty to provide a safe workplace to the employees of the 
independent contractor." R 63. Beckstead purported to support this contention by citing 
Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 408 (1914). 
Beckstead further touted Thompson and Dayton as "[t]he two authoritative cases in 
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this area of the law" (R 63) and the district court apparently agreed. In granting 
Beckstead's motion for summary judgment the district court concluded that because 
Defendant did not control or direct the manner of Plaintiff s work and that 
[because] any danger posed to Plaintiff by the condition of Defendant's 
partially completed home was open and obvious to Plaintiff. . . , under 
current law, Defendant had no duty of care toward Plaintiff concerning the 
manner or method of Plaintiff s work performance and the condition of 
Defendant's property was not such that Defendant would be subject to 
liability to Plaintiff under the facts of this case. 
R102. 
What Beckstead and the district court apparently overlooked was the fact that 
Thompson and Dayton both involved circumstances where the landowner surrendered 
control of the work undertaken by an independent contractor and a third party was injured 
as a result of the manner in which that independent contractor undertook his own 
performance. Neither case involved a dangerous condition on the premises which was 
created or existed independent of the manner in which the contractor undertook his 
performance. Indeed, the language of the Thompson opinion clearly demonstrates that the 
case was decided by application of the legal principles set out in Chapter 15, Topic 2 
(HARM CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE OF A CAREFULLY SELECTED INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR) 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). The district court's reliance thereon was 
clearly misplaced. 
The district court's undisputed material facts include an acknowledgment that 
Beckstead was functioning as the "general contractor" with respect to the construction of 
the subject dwelling. See R 101,1f 4. While Beckstead may not have directed the 
performance of Hale's work, Beckstead was clearly in possession of the subject premises 
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for the purposes of the legal principles outlined in Chapter 13, Topic 1 (LIABILITY OF 
POSSESSORS OF LAND TO PERSONS ON THE LAND) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
Under the undisputed facts of the instance case Beckstead was clearly the "possessor" of 
the real property in question. See, id. § 328E defining "possessor." Moreover, it is 
apparent that Hale was Beckstead's "invitee." See English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d 153, 156-
57 (Utah 1993) (referring to the Restatement rule as "the safe workplace doctrine"). 
A workman who comes upon land to make improvements, alterations or repairs 
thereon has been uniformly held to enjoy the status of an "invitee." See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 332, comment e. See also, English v. Kienke, supra; Fluor 
Corporation, Ltd. v. Sykes, 3 Ariz. App. 559, 416 P.2d 610 (1966); Daniel Const. Co. v. 
Holden, 585 S.W.2d 6 (Ark. 1979); Williamson v. Cox, 844 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. App. 1992); 
Hall v. Moveable Offshore, Inc., 455 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1972). Generally, it is said that 
such a workman is a "business invitee" of the general contractor. See Silvas v. Speros 
Construction Co., 594 P.2d 1029,122 Ariz. 333 (Ariz.App.Div.2 1979), at 120; Daniel 
Const. Co. v. Holden, supra, at Xi 9 and 33. However, when the owner of the real 
property is acting as "general contractor" with respect to improvements being made 
thereon, the workman is his "invitee" within the meaning of section 343 of the 
Restatement. See English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d, at 156. 
The duty Beckstead, as a possessor of land, owed Hale, as his invitee, is set forth 
in sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343, 
comment a (1965), which states that these sections should be read together. The text of § 
343 reads: 
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A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his 
invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he 
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would 
discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and 
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the 
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the 
danger. 
Section 343A, in relevant part, reads: 
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused 
to them by an activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or 
obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite 
such knowledge or obviousness. 
In Silvas v. Spews Construction Co., supra, the appellant was injured when he fell 
through a hole in the roof of a building under construction. The trial court directed a 
verdict in favor of the general contractor. On appeal, the Arizona court noted that the 
propriety of directing the verdict hinged upon the determination of two issues: (1) what, if 
any, duty the general contractor owed to the employees of a subcontractor, and (2) 
whether the fact that appellant knew of the existence of holes on the roof relieved the 
general contractor of liability. 
Speros Construction Company, the general contractor for the construction of a 
gymnasium, subcontracted with Guy Apple for the construction of the gymnasium walls. 
This construction was accomplished in two phases. First the walls were constructed to a 
point where the roof could be installed. After the roof was installed Guy Apple returned 
to the job to complete the installation of a parapet. Silvas was an employee of Guy 
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Apple. 
After completing the first stage of the construction of the walls, Guy Apple 
temporarily left the job and the roofing contractor installed a pre-fabricated roof in which 
there were a number of holes designed to accommodate air conditioning units and ducts, 
which were to be installed by a separate subcontractor. The holes ranged in size from 
two-foot square to four-foot square. 
Guy Apple returned to the construction site to complete the parapet about four 
days after the installation of the roof was completed. Some of the holes in the roof had 
been covered but most had not. The foreman for Guy Apple warned the employees 
about the holes in the roof and told them to be very careful. Silvas himself knew the 
holes were there and that they were not covered. 
Silvas5 job was to transport bricks and mortar from a mixing site on the roof to 
Guy Apple's bricklayers. He noticed that when the wheelbarrow was loaded his ability to 
see the open holes was impaired. However, he did not complain about the danger or 
refuse to work. Two days after returning to construct the parapet, Silvas was pushing a 
loaded wheelbarrow when he fell through one of the holes in the roof and was seriously 
injured. Just before the accident he saw an uncovered hole to his left and pushed his 
wheelbarrow to the right to avoid it. The wheelbarrow obstructed his vision to the right 
and he stepped into another uncovered hole on his right that he had not seen. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the general contractor in control of 
premises has certain duties to the employees of a subcontractor that are usually likened to 
those of a possessor of land owes invitees. Accordingly, Speros owed to Guy Apple 
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employees the duty to keep the joint working spaces reasonably safe. Citing and quoting 
section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court rejected the general 
contractor's contention that it had no reason to believe that Silvas would not protect 
himself against the danger posed by the holes in the roof. Citing the Restatement rule, the 
court concluded that the fact that the injured party knew and appreciated the danger was 
not conclusive. The court went on to quote from comment/to the Restatement section. 
That comment, in relevant part, reads: 
There are, however, cases in which the possessor of land can and should 
anticipate that the dangerous condition will cause physical harm to the 
invitee notwithstanding its known or obvious danger. In such cases the 
possessor is not relieved of the duty of reasonable care which he owes to the 
invitee for his protection. This duty may require him to warn the invitee, or 
to take other reasonable steps to protect him, against the known or obvious 
condition or activity, if the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee 
will nevertheless suffer physical harm. 
Such reason to expect harm to the visitor from known or obvious dangers 
may arise, for example, where the possessor has reason to expect that the 
invitee's attention may be distracted, so that he will not discover what is 
obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself 
against i t . . . that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or 
obvious danger because to a reasonable man in his position the advantages 
of doing so would outweigh the apparent risk. In such cases the fact that 
the danger is known, or is obvious, is important in determining whether the 
invitee is to be charged with contributory negligence, or assumption of risk. 
. . . It is not, however, conclusive in determining the duty of the possessor, 
or whether he has acted reasonably under the circumstances. 
Ultimately the Arizona court concluded that a jury question was presented as to 
whether the general contractor should have anticipated the harm despite Silvas' 
knowledge and should have taken steps to either cover or barricade the holes and that, 
accordingly, the trial court had erred in directing a verdict. 
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The Utah Court of Appeals has had occasion to consider these legal issues. In 
Laws v. Blanding City, 893 P.2d 1083 (Utah Ct. App.1995), Laws initiated an action 
against the defendant city, alleging he was injured as a result of the defendant's 
negligence in the construction and maintenance of the city dump. The jury returned a 
verdict for the city, concluding that the city was not guilty of any negligence. On. appeal, 
Laws contended that the trial court had committed prejudicial error in giving a jury 
instruction which was taken substantially verbatim from the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 343. Laws argued that if subsection (b) of section 343 is not read in conjunction 
with the language of section 343 A, it creates the misleading impression that if the 
plaintiff did not realize or protect himself against the danger, the city's duty was 
abrogated. The court of appeals agreed. 
After quoting section 343 A and accompanying comments/and g, the court 
concluded that the trial court had erred in giving the challenged instruction as it was an 
incomplete and thus misleading statement of the city's duty. Laws had the right to have 
his theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way. The 
question of whether a reasonable person would, recognizing the danger, nevertheless 
encounter it, was a question for the jury. Laws v. Blanding City, 893 P.2d 1083 (Utah Ct. 
App.1995). 
In the instant case, the district court erred in applying the legal principles which 
underlie the decision in Thompson v. Jess to conclude that Beckstead owed Hale no duty 
of care. The district court's error in this application of the law is beyond question and 
requires reversal of the order granting Beckstead summary judgment. 
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POINT II 
THE PERTINENT OSHA REGULATIONS ARE RELEVANT IN 
DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF CARE AND 
WHETHER THERE WAS A BREACH OF THAT STANDARD. 
Hale concedes that a violation of an OSHA regulation does not provide an 
independent basis of liability-does not create a cause of action where none existed before. 
See 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1985). However, this does not mean that pertinent OSHA 
regulations are not relevant in determining an appropriate standard of conduct. See 
Knapstad v. Smith's Management, 114 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah Ct. App.1989). 
In Tollman v. City of Hurricane, 985 P.2d 892 (Utah 1999), the Utah Supreme 
Court noted: 
In determining the appropriate standard of conduct, the Restatement permits 
courts to adopt a standard from legislative enactments or administrative 
regulations which do not themselves purport to establish the standard. See 
Restatement § 285. Thus, despite UOSHA's provision prohibiting its use to 
affect common-law rights, duties, or liabilities of employers, the factfinder 
may look to UOSHA and OSHA for evidence of industry standards in 
certain circumstances. The Restatement provides the following guidelines 
for the adoption of legislative standards: 
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a 
reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or 
an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be 
exclusively or in part 
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose 
interest is invaded, and 
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and 
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has 
resulted, and 
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from 
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which the harm results. 
Restatement § 286. OSHA and UOSHA explicitly purport to protect the 
safety and health of workers at work. 
Tallman was a worker injured on the job, thus satisfying clauses (a) and (b) 
of Restatement § 286. OSHA has specifically required that trenches over 5 
feet in depth and dug in unstable rock have trench protection to prevent 
workers from being injured in cave-ins. UOSHA has adopted these 
standards. Tallman worked in a trench that was deeper than 5 feet and was 
apparently dug in unstable soil without trench protection. The trench caved 
in and killed him; therefore, this case implicates clauses (c) and (d) as well. 
Thus, in this case we may adopt OSHA and UOSHA regulations as 
evidence of the standard of reasonable care in the industry. Because 
OSHA standards are so widely known, understood, and followed, they 
constitute a legitimate source for the standard of reasonable care, and we 
hereby approve their use as evidence of such. 
Id., at ^f 21-22. Emphasis added, citations omitted. Cf Srader v. Pecos Construction 
Co., 71 N.M. 320, 378 P.2d 364 (1963) (general contractor's duty to roofer's helper 
determined by reference to provision of city building code). 
Section 1926.501 of Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations, in effect at the time of 
the subject accident, establishes standards concerning the circumstances in which fall 
protection systems are required and 29 C.F.R. §1926.502 establishes the criteria to which 
such systems must conform. Subsection 1926.501(b)(1) requires fall protection for 
persons working on or near a walking/working surface (horizontal and vertical surface) 
with an unprotected side or edge which is 6 feet (1.8 m) or more above a lower level. 
In establishing the criteria to which such fall protection systems must conform, 
subsection 1926.502(b) provides: 
(1) Top edge height of top rails, or equivalent guardrail system members, 
shall be 42 inches (1.1m) plus or minus 3 inches (8 cm) above the 
walking/working level. When conditions warrant, the height of the top edge 
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may exceed the 45-inch height, provided the guardrail system meets all 
other criteria of this paragraph. . . . 
(3) Guardrail systems shall be capable of withstanding, without failure, a 
force of at least 200 pounds . . . applied within 2 inches (5.1 cm) of the top 
edge, in any outward or downward direction, at any point along the top 
edge. 
(4) When the 200 pound . . . test load specified in paragraph (b)(3) of this 
section is applied in a downward direction, the top edge of the guardrail 
shall not deflect to a height less than 39 inches (1.0 m) above the 
walking/working level. 
In the instant case, Beckstead clearly owed Hale the duty to keep the joint working 
spaces reasonably safe. Evidence that Beckstead failed to comply with pertinent OSHA 
regulations, while not creating a cause of action where none existed before, is relevant in 
demonstrating that Beckstead failed to adhere to the standards of reasonable care 
generally accepted in the industry and therefore breached the duty he owed Hale. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's determination that Beckstead, the general contractor, owed no 
duty to Hale, the subcontractor, a business invitee, for a dangerous condition created and 
maintained by Beckstead, is erroneous and contrary to Utah law. Further, the district 
court's determination that Hale cannot use Beckstead's violation of OSHA standards to 
show duty and breach by Beckstead is erroneous and contrary to Utah law. Based upon 
the forgoing it is respectfully submitted that the order granting Beckstead summary 
judgment be reversed and the case remanded for trial; with instruction to the district court 
that Hale may show Beckstead's duty and breach through Beckstead's violation of OSHA 
standards. 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN D. HALE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KURT BECKSTEAD, and 
JOHN DOES I-V, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 000500437 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on January 10, 2002 pursuant to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment which was filed July 20,2001. The motion was 
opposed by Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition which was filed September 7, 2001. 
Defendant also filed a Reply Memorandum on September 19, 2001. Having read the 
memoranda and supporting affidavits, having heard the arguments of counsel, and having 
reviewed the file for this action, the Court rules as follows: 
FACTS 
Although there are minor quibbles as to some details of the facts presented by 
Defendant's Motion, there is no genuine issue as to the following facts: 
1. Plaintiff complains in this action of injuries he received in a fall. 
2. Defendant was the owner of the property at which Plaintiff fell. 
3. A home was under construction on Defendant's property, and Plaintiff was 
inside the partially-completed home, at the time of Plaintiff s fall. 
4. Defendant was acting as his own "general contractor" for the construction of 
the home. 
5. Defendant hired Plaintiff to paint the home. 
6. Defendant told Plaintiff generally how the paint should look, and bought the 
paint for Plaintiff to use. 
7. Defendant did not control or direct the manner in which Plaintiff was to paint 
the home. 
8. While inside the partially-constructed home, Plaintiff inadvertently stepped off 
a second floor balcony and fell to the first level. 
9. There is no evidence that Plaintiff had authority to enter Defendant's premises 
for any purpose other than to complete his contract to paint the home, 
10. Defendant was not in the home when Plaintiff fell, but was out of town on an 
extended vacation. 
There are no genuine issues as to any other material facts.1 
lIt has been the experience of this Court and others at the trial court level that the facts on which we rely 
are occasionally changed at the appellate court level, even to include facts which were not presented to the trial 
court at all This appears to result occasionally from appellate attorneys failing to give the appellate courts a 
complete record of the facts as they were presented to the trial court. On a motion for summary judgment, this 
Court feels constrained to consider only those facts which are presented in compliance with Role 4-501 of the Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration, and it is this Court's opinion that an appellate review which extends beyond 
those facts is a de novo review rather than an appeal and, therefore, is erroneous. Consequently, this Court 
emphasizes that this Ruling is based on the set of facts specified above. 
2 
ANALYSIS2 
Plaintiffs Complaint asserts claims titled "Negligence," "Violation of Statute, 
Ordinance or Safety Order/' and "Premises Liability." Defendant seeks summary judgment 
as to each of these claims. 
Plaintiffs first and third claims both fail on the issue of Defendant's duty to Plaintiff 
under the circumstances presented in this case. This Court is persuaded that Plaintiff fell 
while on Defendant's premises as a business visitor or invitee, that Defendant did not control 
or direct the manner of Plaintiffs work, and that any danger posed to Plaintiff by the 
condition of Defendant's partially completed home was open and obvious to Plaintiff. 
Consequently, under current law, Defendant had no duty of care toward Plaintiff concerning 
the manner or method of Plaintiff's work performance and the condition of Defendant's 
property was not such that Defendant would be subject to liability to Plaintiff under the facts 
of this case.3 
2This Court is fully aware of the now-frequent instruction of the appellate courts for the trial courts to 
make a more extensive analysis in rulings such as this. See, e.g., Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 2001 UT App 
277, 431 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, That instruction is not always realistic, however. First, the caseloads of the trial 
courts continue to increase while many courts' time and resources remain stagnant; for example, the judicial 
resources in this district have remained the same for over 12 years in spite of the overwhelming growth in the 
population and case filings in the district. Second, appellate reviews of summary judgment decisions of the Utah 
district courts resulted in a reversal rate well over 50% in reported cases decided in the Utah appellate courts in the 
year 2000, In light of the huge caseloads carried by the trial courts, the time required for the drafting of a detailed 
ruling,which is more likely to be reversed than to be affirmed, is often too great a luxury for a trial judge to afford. 
5This Court expresses no opinion as to whether the current law should change or may change upon further 
review by an appellate court. But see, e.g., Kessler v. Mortenson 2000 UT 95, 16 P.3d 1225. 
3 
Plaintiffs second claim alleges liability based on Defendant's alleged violations of 
provisions of, and/or regulations under, the federal Occupational and Safety Health Act or 
"OSHA." Defendant has cited strong authority for his argument that OSHA does not permit 
a private cause of action, and Plaintiff has not cited any authority to the contrary. 
CONCLUSION 
There are no genuine issues of material fact before this Court, and Defendant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, dismissing Plaintiffs complaint. Defendant's 
Motion is hereby granted, and Defendant's counsel is hereby directed to submit an 
appropriate judgment pursuant to RJA Rule 4-504. 
Dated this Q day of February, 2002. 
G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE 
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